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We conducted online field experiments in large real-world social networks in 
order to decompose prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism 
toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over 
random strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction. 
Directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52% relative to random strangers, 
whereas future interaction effects increase giving by an additional 24% when giv- 
ing is socially efficient. This finding suggests that future interaction affects giving 
through a repeated game mechanism where agents can be rewarded for grant- 
ing efficiency-enhancing favors. We also find that subjects with higher baseline 
altruism have friends with higher baseline altruism. 
I. Introduction 
Real world social networks provide a natural laboratory to 
study prosocial behavior. Friends help each other frequently and 
often substantially. In the 1995 General Social Survey, 55% of 
Americans reported that they first approached close friends and 
family members when they needed to borrow a large sum of money 
(Mobius and Szeidl 2007). In a 2007 UK YouGov survey, 48% of 
respondents reported lending, on average, $1,800 to friends and 
relatives during the past twelve months (YouGov 2007). Similarly, 
close friends and relatives are the predominant source of informal 
insurance against risk in developing countries (Townsend 1994; 
Udry 1994). 
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Economists have explored two main explanations of prosocial 
behavior - selfless altruism and expectations of reciprocal favors 
in future exchanges. Because people tend to interact frequently 
with friends toward whom they have the strongest altruistic feel- 
ings, these mechanisms are difficult to distinguish empirically.1 
In this paper, we use two online field experiments in a real world 
social network to solve this identification problem. Our design al- 
lows us to selectively switch off the reciprocity mechanism in some 
treatments, and thereby separately measure the strength of the 
altruism and reciprocity mechanisms. 
The ability of our methodology to distinguish between these 
two mechanisms has several applications. For example, many re- 
searchers have documented that as societies transition to market 
economies, market transactions replace bilateral reciprocal ex- 
changes, leading to a decline in social capital.2 By using our diag- 
nostic games to identify cultures where the social ties are either 
heavily reciprocity-based or heavily altruism-based, economists 
may be better able to explain differences in the social disrup- 
tion caused by markets. Additionally, our finding (described be- 
low) that the reciprocal mechanism only applies to transactions 
that are efficient suggests a policy use of our techniques. Develop- 
ment programs such as microfinance that use social ties to encour- 
age lending and insurance may be most effective in communities 
where the social networks have a strong reciprocity component, 
because relationships based on trading efficiency-enhancing fa- 
vors may help direct resources toward efficient uses. Thus, pol- 
icymakers could use experiments such as ours to identify areas 
where intervention may be most effective. 
In our experiments, we distinguish three components of 
prosocial giving: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected 
strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over random 
strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future 
interaction. We begin by directly measuring the social networks 
of Harvard undergraduates to identify, for each subject, socially 
close direct friends, less close friends of friends, and socially 
1. Economists and sociologists use both frequency of interaction (Marmaros 
and Sacerdote 2006) and intensity of altruism interchangeably to measure the 
strength of social connections (Granovetter 1974, 1985; Marsden and Campbell 
1984; Mitchell 1987; Perlman and Fehr 1987; Mathews et al. 1998). 
2. See for example Coleman (1993) on the industrial revolution in Western 
societies, Völker (1995) on the change from communism to capitalism in East 
Germany, and Yellen (1990) on the increased participation of the Kalahari !Kung 
in markets. 
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distant strangers. We then conduct a series of online games 
where subjects make unilateral allocation decisions for several 
types of named partners and one nameless partner (a randomly 
selected participant from the subject's dormitory). The games are 
either modified dictator games, as in Andreoni and Miller (2002), 
or a new "helping ame." Subjects make multiple decisions but 
are paid for one decision selected at random. For some decisions, 
neither participant is told which of the decision maker's choices 
was implemented. In these anonymous decisions, the difference 
in allocations between friends and strangers allows us to quantify 
the magnitude of directed altruism. In particular, we find that 
subjects send on average 52% more money to close friends than to 
strangers. We also demonstrate hat giving to friends i  strongly 
related to the decision makers' underlying baseline altruism 
toward nameless partners. 
For other decisions, both the decision maker and the partner 
are informed which of the decision maker's choices was selected for 
payment. We use the difference b tween this nonanonymous and 
the anonymous treatment tomeasure the separate effect of future 
interaction on prosocial behavior. We find that the nature of the 
future interaction effect depends crucially on the social welfare 
effects of prosocial behavior. When giving increases joint surplus, 
subjects increase giving to friends (relative to strangers) by an 
additional 24% in the nonanonymous treatment. Thus, directed 
altruism is roughly twice as strong as future interaction effects 
in determining giving behavior. When giving decreases joint sur- 
plus, subjects do not give more to friends in the nonanonymous 
treatment. Incontrast, he directed altruism effect favors friends 
over strangers both when prosocial behavior is socially efficient 
and when it is inefficient. 
These differential effects of future interaction on prosocial 
behavior are well explained by the theory of repeated games. 
Karlan et al. (2009) develop a tractable theory for analyzing 
repeated games in social networks, which we adapt to our set- 
ting and call the enforced reciprocity model. In that model, a 
decision maker can safely grant favors (in the form of larger 
allocations) to partners when the relationship between them is 
stronger and more valuable, because the partner would rather e- 
pay the favor than damage the friendship. Granting favors, how- 
ever, only benefits both the decision maker and partner when 
giving increases ocial surplus. This conflicts with Benabou and 
Tirole's (2006) model, where individuals give in order to signal 
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being of an altruistic type. The signaling model predicts that ex- 
cess giving to friends hould increase for all the games (and all 
exchange rates), because giving still distinguishes altruists from 
selfish types. The enforced reciprocity model also predicts that 
giving should increase if the decision maker and partner share a 
greater number of common friends (controlling for social distance). 
We confirm this prediction i  our data. This provides further evi- 
dence for the enforced reciprocity model and distinguishes it from 
related theories such as preference-based r ciprocity (Rabin 1993; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004). This result also highlights 
the influence of second-order links and network structure on eco- 
nomic decisions. 
Last, we show that decision makers who exhibit greater base- 
line altruism are treated more generously by their friends. How- 
ever, we show that friends do not reward intrinsic kindness, but 
rather, that kind people tend to have friends who exhibit greater 
baseline altruism themselves. 
Our paper builds on a rich experimental literature on other- 
regarding preferences and cooperation. Altruistic behavior toward 
strangers has been observed in a variety of laboratory contexts 
(see Camerer [2003] for an extensive survey). Hoffman, McCabe, 
and Smith (1996) suggest hat a decrease in perceived social dis- 
tance increases donations in dictator games. Our paper reduces 
social distance in two ways: (a) we distinguish between giving 
to friends and giving to strangers; and (b) we either reveal or 
do not reveal which decision is implemented. Our online exper- 
imental design is a significant methodological advance because 
it provides a practical way to match subjects with their real- 
world friends.3 Lab experiments that relax traditional anonymous 
matching of strangers typically reveal demographic characteris- 
tics such as gender or ethnicity (for example, see Fershtman and 
Gneezy [2001]). Very few laboratory experiments explicitly rely 
on subjects' ongoing relationships with their friends as we do 
in our nonanonymous treatment. Instead, repeated interactions 
are incorporated directly into the experimental design, increasing 
prosocial behavior (see Roth and Murninghan [1978] and Murn- 
inghan and Roth [1983] for early examples). A notable exception 
is the seminal work of Glaeser et al. (2000), who match subjects at 
various ocial distances in a trust game.4 In subsequent research, 
3. Our experimental design fits the definition of an arte factual field experiment from Harrison and List (2004). 
4. See also Polzer, Neale, and Glenn (1993) comparing allocations to friends and strangers in an ultimatum game. 
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Goeree et al. (2008) have adopted the anonymous treatment of 
our experimental design (using a standard dictator game) and 
also find strong evidence for directed altruism in a school network 
of teenage girls (also see Brañas-Garza et al. [2006] for data from 
experiments with European university students). To the best of 
our knowledge, our design is the first o distinguish between di- 
rected altruism and future interaction effects in social networks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II de- 
scribes everal relevant heories - enforced reciprocity, signaling, 
and preference-based r ciprocity - and reviews their testable im- 
plications. Section III presents the experimental design. Section 
IV summarizes the main features of the data. Our empirical 
results on directed altruism are presented in Section V. Section VI 
analyzes decisions under nonanonymity. In Section VII, we con- 
sider two benchmarks comparing the importance and magnitude 
of the directed altruism and future interaction effects. Section 
VIII shows that friends tend to have similar levels of baseline 
altruism. Section IX concludes by discussing the implications of 
our results for the theoretical nd empirical nalysis of prosocial 
behavior. 
II. Theoretical Framework 
We briefly review the predictions of three different theories 
that explain decision making when there is a prospect of future 
interaction. We refer the interested reader to the earlier NBER 
working paper for a detailed formal treatment of each theory 
(Leider et al. 2007). We assume throughout that there is a 
decision maker, M, and a partner, P, who are embedded in a 
social network. We calculate the social distance Dmp between the 
decision maker and the partner as the shortest path connecting 
them: for example, two direct friends have a social distance of 1, 
whereas a friend of a friend is at distance 2 (see Figure I). The 
decision maker's allocation decisions in the anonymous treatment 
(neither decision maker nor partner learns about the decision) 
and the nonanonymous treatment (both agents learn about the 
decision) are denoted by xmp and xmp, respectively (coded so that 
a larger x implies greater prosocial behavior).5 
We assume, as a starting point, that decision makers have 
altruistic preferences whose strength varies with social distance. 
5. Therefore, the decision maker's utility is decreasing in x and the partner's 
utility is increasing in x. 
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Figure I 
Examples to Illustrate Difference between Maximum Network Flow 
and Social Distance 
All links are assumed to have unit capacity. The examples illustrate the dif- 
ferent features of the social network that are captured by social distance and 
maximum network flow, respectively: the addition of common friends will neces- 
sarily increase flow but can leave social distance unchanged. 
We use a simple linear specification to capture decision making in 
the anonymous treatment, which is a natural extension of existing 
preferences-based altruism models:6 
(1) xMp = ocZmp + YiDmp + YM + tMP. 
We control for observable demographic characteristics of both in- 
dividuals {Zmp). The coefficient ym captures the decision maker's 
intrinsic generosity toward all partners (independent of social dis- 
tance), which we refer to as his or her baseline altruism. The co- 
efficient y' determines how the decision maker's altruism varies 
with social distance, which we call directed altruism. 
U.A. Enforced Reciprocity 
Repeated games provide a natural framework to analyze the 
decision maker's allocation, xmp, under the prospect of future in- 
teractions. However, repeated games typically admit many equi- 
libria even in a two-person setting - this multiplicity problem is 
compounded for social networks where hundreds of agents often 
interact. Karlan et al. (2009) provide a tractable framework for 
6. Andreoni (1990) models altruism as a "warm glow," whereas Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Charness and Rabin (2002) 
focus on preferences over payoff distributions. 
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modeling repeated game effects in social networks. They assume 
that decision maker and partner share a relationship that is con- 
sumed in the future and gives both of them utility Vmp- A decision 
maker who is more prosocial under nonanonymity compared to 
anonymity, such that xmp - xmp > 0, grants a favor to the part- 
ner and can use the value of the relationship to the partner as 
social collateral to enforce repayment of the favor. If the partner 
refuses to return the favor the relationship breaks down and both 
agents lose the value of the friendship. 
In our working paper, we formally show that in the unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium the decision maker allocates a larger 
amount under nonanonymity compared to anonymity only when 
giving is efficient, and thus increases social surplus. In this case, 
both the decision maker and the partner keep some of the surplus 
created by the favor. In contrast, when giving is inefficient a favor 
that has to be repaid makes both the decision maker and the 
partner worse off. 
We can also show that the difference in allocations between 
the nonanonymous and anonymous treatments, xmp - xmp, is in- 
creasing in the value of the relationship Vmp because the decision 
maker is willing to grant, and the partner is willing to repay, larger 
favors. This motivates the following empirical model of allocation 
decisions under nonanonymity: 
(2) xMp = r]ZMp + 0xMp + </>VMp + vM + ¿mp- 
We include the decision maker's anonymous decision, xmp, as a 
covariate, because our enforced reciprocity model predicts devi- 
ations from the anonymous benchmark. The model also predicts 
that enforced reciprocity and altruism are substitutes (0 < 1): be- 
cause the decision maker will give the largest enforceable favor 
(when giving is efficient) and the partner will retain some of the 
surplus, the decision maker's marginal utility from giving an ad- 
ditional altruistic gift is smaller than in the anonymous case (the 
partner is now richer than in the anonymous case). 
We consider two proxies for the value of the relationship, 
Vmp- First, we expect that relationship value decreases with so- 
cial distance because a decision maker is less likely to interact 
with a socially distant partner in the future. Second, the enforced 
reciprocity model of Karlan et al. (2009) suggests maximum net- 
work flow as an alternative measure. The maximum flow counts 
the number of distinct paths between decision maker and partner 
(see Figure I). Network flow captures structural features of the 
1822 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
social network that are not captured by social distance alone. For 
example, having more friends in common increases network flow, 
whereas ocial distance is unchanged. Network flow formalizes a 
common intuition i  the sociology literature that dense networks 
strengthen trust by facilitating informal arrangements (Coleman 
1988, 1990). In Karlan et al.'s (2009) enforced reciprocity model, 
each common friend increases the social collateral between the 
decision maker and the partner. The decision maker is able to 
extract repayments for larger favors, because if the partner de- 
faults he or she will lose the relationship with all of the common 
friends as well as the decision maker. Throughout, we calculate 
network flow by only including links that are at most a distance 
K = 2 away from the decision maker. Karlan et al. (2009) justify 
this choice of a circle of trust of K = 2 by reviewing some of the 
existing empirical literature in economics and sociology, such as 
Granovetter(1974). 
Table I summarizes the main predictions of the enforced reci- 
procity model (as well as the signaling- and preference-based r ci- 
procity models discussed below). 
II.B. Signaling 
In recent work, Benabou and Tiróle (2006) propose a sig- 
naling model that provides an alternative theory for explaining 
greater generosity o friends under nonanonymity. In their frame- 
work, agents care about being perceived as altruistic (rather than 
greedy) types, so they act more generously when their actions can 
be observed. Moreover, it is reasonable to extend their model to 
assume that individuals care more about signaling enerosity to 
friends than to strangers, because they are more likely to interact 
with friends in the future. 
A key distinguishing prediction of the signaling model is that 
decision makers hould increase their allocation decision under 
nonanonymity compared to anonymity both when prosocial be- 
havior is efficient and when it is inefficient. Larger allocations 
are just as good (if not better) signals of generosity when giv- 
ing is inefficient as when giving is efficient. Additionally, excess 
giving under nonanonymity is independent of the level of altru- 
ism in Benabou and Tirole's (2006) model, because signaling util- 
ity and distributional utility are additively separable. This effect 
contrasts with the enforced reciprocity model, where altruism and 
favors are substitutes. 
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TABLE I 
Testable Predictions about Decision Makers' Allocation Decisions under 
nonanonymity versus anonymity 
Enforced Preference-based 
reciprocity Signaling reciprocity 
Greater generosity Yes Yes Yes 
toward friends (0 > 0) 
when giving is 
efficient 
Greater generosity No Yes No 
toward friends (0 > 0) 
when giving is 
inefficient 
Altruistic decision Yes No Yes 
makers are relatively 
less generous toward 
friends compared to 
strangers 
Maximum network flow Yes No No 
is a separate predictor 
of generosity beyond 
social distance 
Note. We estimate the empirical model x^jp = r¡Z + Oxj^p + ^ MP + VM + €MP> where x^p and x'jp 
are the decision maker's actions under nonanonymity and anonymity, respectively, and V^p describes the 
value of the relationship between decision maker and partner (proxied by social distance). 
U.C. Preference-Based Reciprocity 
A third possible mechanism for future interaction effects i
preference-based r ciprocity. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) 
develop a psychological game theory model of sequential reci- 
procity, where an individual treats kindly (unkindly) those who 
have treated/will treat him or her kindly (unkindly). As in en- 
forced reciprocity, the decision maker increases his or her alloca- 
tion between onanonymity and anonymity only when giving is 
efficient, anticipating that with some probability, assumed to be 
decreasing in social distance, the partner may act to benefit he 
decision maker. 
Under preference-based reciprocity, however, the partner's 
desire to return the decision maker's favor is intrinsic, rather than 
designed to preserve the relationship with the decision maker or 
common friends. Therefore, unlike the enforced reciprocity model, 
preference-based r ciprocity would not predict that the network 
flow measure independently correlates with increased generosity 
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Overview of Experimental Design (Waves 1 and 2) 
In Wave 1, we randomized whether subjects first made all the nameless deci- 
sions or whether they first made all the named decisions. For each named partner 
in Wave 1, we randomized whether subjects first submitted their anonymous choice 
for that partner or their nonanonymous choice. We also randomized whether a sub- 
ject first submitted all anonymous (nonanonymous) choices for all partners on a 
single screen, or whether a subject submitted both anonymous and nonanonymous 
choices on a separate screen for each partner. Finally, we randomized the order in 
which the three different exchange rates were listed on subjects' screens. 
after controlling for the frequency of future interaction (via social 
distance). 
III. Experimental Design 
Figure II presents the major features of our experimental de- 
sign. In order to recruit more subjects and map a larger social net- 
work, all communication with subjects was conducted by e-mail 
and all choices were submitted on a website (rather than in a 
laboratory) that subjects could access with a password through 
their own web browsers. We conducted two waves of the experi- 
ment. In each wave, we first used a novel task to elicit the social 
network truthfully. We then had subjects play an allocation game 
with other subjects in the network. In Wave 1, we used modified 
dictator games with varying exchange rates, and in Wave 2, we 
used a new helping game. In both waves, decision makers first 
decided on allocations between themselves and other unnamed 
("nameless") partners, and then, a few days later, made several 
allocations between themselves and named partners (identified 
by real first and last name) at various social distances. For both 
waves, a single decision was randomly selected for payment and 
all players were informed of their earnings by e-mail. 
DIRECTED ALTRUISM AND ENFORCED RECIPROCITY 1825 
We conducted two major information treatments, using a 
within-subject design in Wave 1 and a between-subjects design 
in Wave 2. In these treatments, we varied how much informa- 
tion was revealed to both parties at the end of the experiment. 
In the "anonymous" treatment, each subject was merely informed 
of his or her total payoff or the experiment - neither decision 
makers nor partners found out which particular decision was im- 
plemented. In the "nonanonymous" treatment, both the decision 
maker and the partner were told both their total payoff and which 
decision was implemented. 
III. A. Design for Wave 1: Coordination Task and Dictator Games 
Network Elicitation. To measure the social network, we used 
a coordination task to provide subjects incentives to truthfully 
report their friendships. Each subject listed his or her ten best 
friends and the average amount of time per week he or she spends 
with each of them.7 Each time a listed friend also listed the sub- 
ject, the subject was paid 50 cents, with probability 0.5 if their 
answers about time spent together disagreed, or with probabil- 
ity 0.75 if they agreed. We made the expected payoff (25 or 37.50 
cents) large enough to give an incentive to list their friends truth- 
fully, and small enough to discourage "gaming." The randomiza- 
tion was included to limit disappointment if a subject was only 
named by a few people. To define the social network, we say that 
two subjects have a direct link if at least one of them named the 
other. We call this type of social network the "OR-network."8 
Allocation Game. After measuring the social network, we 
randomly assigned each subject the role of decision maker or 
partner in the dictator games.9 Each decision maker then played 
modified dictator games with a nameless partner randomly 
selected from the decision maker's dormitory.10 He or she was 
asked to make allocation decisions for both the anonymous and 
7. The choices were 0-30 minutes, 30 minutes to 1 hour, 1-2 hours, 2-4 hours, 
4-8 hours, or more than 8 hours. 
8. We find similar results using the "AND-network, where a link exists only it 
both subjects name each other. The OR-network has desirable monotonicity prop- 
erties: a subject with an above average number of actual friends will have an above 
average number of friends in the measured network even if the survey truncates 
his true network. This is not always true for the AND-network iftruncation forces 
subjects to select randomly from a set of equally close friends. 
9. In the experimental instructions, we referred to the two roles simply as 
player 1 and player 2. 
10. The decision maker is told in the instructions that the recipient was se- 
lected from his or her dormitory. 
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the nonanonymous conditions. The decision maker allocated 
50 tokens between him- or herself and the recipient. However, 
the value of a token to the decision maker and to the recipient 
differed between games. In one case a token was worth 10 cents to 
the decision maker, and 30 cents to the recipient ("1:3"), whereas 
in a second case they were worth 20 cents to the decision maker 
and 20 cents to the recipient ("1:1"), and in a third case they 
were worth 30 cents to the decision maker and 10 cents to the 
recipient ("3:1"). We can therefore observe allocations when giving 
is efficient, neutral, and inefficient. Each decision maker made 
allocation choices for each of the three token money exchange 
rates. 
A few days later, decision makers played in a second round, 
in which they were matched in random order with five different 
named partners listed using their real first and last names: (1) 
a direct friend (social distance SD = 1), (2) a friend of a friend 
(SD = 2), (3) a friend of a friend of a friend (SD = 3), (4) a student 
in the same staircase/floor who is at least distance 4 removed from 
the student (SD > 3), and (5) a randomly selected student from 
the same dormitory who falls into none of the above categories.11 
Once again, the decision maker was asked to make allocation 
decisions in both the anonymous and nonanonymous situations. 
The decision maker made allocation decisions under the three 
different exchange rates (3:1, 1:1, and 1:3) for each partner. 
To control for experimenter demand effects of presentation, 
we randomized whether subjects first made all the nameless de- 
cisions or first made all the named decisions. For each named 
partner in Wave 1, we randomized whether subjects first sub- 
mitted their anonymous choice or their nonanonymous choice. 
We also randomized whether a subject first submitted all anony- 
mous (nonanonymous) choices for all partners on a single screen, 
or whether a subject submitted anonymous and nonanonymous 
choices on separate screens for each partner. Finally, we random- 
ized the order in which the three different exchange rates were 
listed on subjects' screens. 
Note that each decision maker made six decisions for each 
partner involving three different exchange rates under anony- 
mous and nonanonymous treatments (36 decisions in total). This 
11. Our selection algorithm used the "AND"-network definition for this step. 
Because social distance always (weakly) decreases when using the "OR"-social 
distance definitions, the numbers of observations for columns (1) to (4) in Table II 
are not equal. 
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made it very difficult for a participant to identify which decision 
was chosen ex post from her earnings.12 
III.B. Design for Wave 2: Trivia Task and Helping Game 
Network Elicitation. To focus on relationships with a high 
frequency of interaction, we developed the trivia task technique 
to elicit he social network for the second wave. Each subject listed 
ten friends about whom they would answer questions. Over sev- 
eral weeks, several of the listed friends were randomly selected 
and each were sent an e-mail asking him or her to answer a 
multiple choice question about him- or herself (e.g., "What time 
do you get up in the morning?"). Subjects then received e-mail 
directing them to a web page where they had fifteen seconds to 
answer the same question about their friends. If the subjects and 
their friends submitted i entical answers, they both won a prize. 
The trivia task provides ubjects with incentives to list friends 
that the subjects pend time with frequently (and thus are more 
likely to know the friends' habits). 
Allocation Game. For the second wave we used a new allo- 
cation game to capture the kind of helping behavior that occurs 
in natural relationships, where an individual might face different 
opportunity costs to help a friend who needs a favor. In the help- 
ing game, each decision maker was endowed with $45, and each 
partner was endowed with $0. The decision makers were asked 
to report the maximum price that they would be willing to pay 
in order for the partner to receive a gain of $30. A random price 
between $0 and $30 was determined, and if their maximum will- 
ingness to pay was equal or greater than the random price the 
partner eceived $30 and the random price was deducted from 
the decision maker's endowment. Otherwise, the decision maker's 
payoff equalled the endowment of $45, and the partner's payoff 
equaled the endowment of $0. 
Effectively, the decision makers revealed how much they 
valued a $30 gain for the partners. As in the first design, subjects 
12. Although in principle the dictator could reveal his or her allocation to the 
partner after the experiment in the anonymous case, because dictators were not 
told which decision was selected for payment, they would have had to make choices 
with unique payoffs so that they would know which partner to inform, and remem- 
ber those choices several weeks later when payments were made. Postexperiment 
breaking of anonymity is also less of a concern in the Helping Game (described 
in the next section), because the partners could not verify which subjects helped 
them, because all help yields the same payoff; nor could they verify the helpers 
cutoff, only that it was higher than the unknown price. 
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made two rounds of decisions: first they played with a nameless 
partner, and then they played with four named partners. Also, we 
chose a between-subjects design for the anonymity manipulation: 
the decisions for the nameless partner were always anonymous, 
whereas in the second round decisions were either all anonymous 
or all nonanonymous. Every subject played both roles in the game, 
that of a decision maker and that of a partner, which allowed 
us to test whether the baseline altruism of the recipient affects 
the decision maker's choice. To control for experimenter demand 
effects of presentation, we randomized the order of named 
partners. 
IV. Data Description 
IV.A. Dictator Games 
In December 2003, Harvard sophomores, juniors, and seniors 
at two dormitories were recruited through posters, flyers, and 
mail invitations. Subjects who logged onto the website were asked 
to (1) list their best friends' names using the coordination task 
and (2) fill in a basic demographic questionnaire. Subjects were 
required to name friends from the two participating dormitories. 
Subjects were paid their earnings from the coordination task, plus 
a flat payment of $10 for completing the survey. They were also 
eligible to earn cash prizes in a raffle, adding $3 (on average) 
in earnings. Experimental earnings were added to the student's 
electronic ash card.13 
Of the 806 students in those two dormitories, 569 (71%) par- 
ticipated in the social network survey. The survey generated 5,690 
one-way links. Of those, 2,086 links were symmetric links where 
both subjects named each other.14 The resulting OR-network con- 
sists of a single connected component with 802 subjects, forming 
a comprehensive map of the social network. 
The dictator game stage was conducted over a one-week pe- 
riod in May 2004. Half of all subjects who participated in the coor- 
dination stage were randomly selected to be decision makers. Out 
of 284 eligible decision makers invited, 193 participated in round 
1 (decisions for nameless partners) and 181 of those participated 
13. These cards are widely used on campus as a cash substitute, and many 
off-campus merchants accept the cards. 
14. For symmetric links, the two subjects assessment of the amount of time 
spent together in a typical week did not differ more than one category out of five 
in 80% of all cases. 
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in round 2 (decisions for named partners). The participants were 
representative of the coordination stage sample composition. 
TV.B. The Helping Game 
Information  social networks was collected in December 
2004 through an online trivia task advertised on the popular 
student social website facebook.com.15 A total of 2,360 students 
signed up, generating 12,782 links between participants out of 
23,600 total links16 with 6,880 symmetric links. In total, 5,576 
out of the 6,389 undergraduates at Harvard either participated 
in the trivia task or were named by a participant. Upperclass- 
men had higher participation rates, with only 34% of freshman 
responding, but with 45%, 52%, and 53% of sophomores, juniors, 
and seniors participating, respectively. The social "OR"-network 
of 5,576 individuals contains a single component (meaning all in- 
dividuals are connected) with a mean path length of 4.2 between 
participants. 
The helping ame stage was conducted in May 200617 over a 
one-week period with all juniors and seniors who had participated 
in the previous academic year's trivia task. A total of 776 subjects 
participated in the first part of the helping ame (decisions for 
nameless partners), and 695 subjects completed the second part 
(decisions for named partners). 
TV. C. Summary Statistics 
Table II shows the mean actions of decision makers for the dic- 
tator and helping ames, for both the anonymous and nonanony- 
mous treatments. Two patterns are clear: in all games and in both 
treatments, he decision makers' generosity toward their partners 
decreased with social distance, and for any game and at any so- 
cial distance, the decision makers' generosity is always higher 
under nonanonymity than under anonymity. Differences between 
treatments are significant across all social distances in the dicta- 
tor game, and for social distances 1 and 2 in the helping ame. 
For both games and both treatments, decision makers' allocation 
choices are significantly larger for partners who are direct friends 
than for partners at any other social distance. 
15. More than 90% of Harvard undergraduates were already members of 
f acebook .com at that time. 
16. Subjects could also list nonparticipants in our experiment as friends. 
17. During both waves ot the experiment, the network information was also 
used for other experiments. 
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TABLE II 
Summary Statistics for Decision Makers' Actions in Dictator 
and Helping Games 
SD=1 SD = 2 SD = S SD = 4 SD = 5 Nameless 
Anonymous treatment 
Dictator game (N = 206) (N = 286) (N = 312) (N = 97) (N = 4) (N = 193) 
Ex. rate 1:3 19.19 16.80 15.14 12.20 12.50 17.42 
(19.64) (19.30) (18.79) (15.47) (25.00) (18.21) 
Ex. rate 1:1 11.96 10.79 9.39 8.79 6.25 11.61 
(13.53) (12.68) (11.89) (10.25) (12.50) (12.83) 
Ex. rate 3:1 8.03 7.28 5.66 6.15 0.00 8.31 
(13.55) (12.88) (11.10) (10.72) (0.00) (13.23) 
Helping game {N = 876) (N = 149) (N = 73) (N = 181) (N = 78) (N = 776) 
12.77 8.97 7.14 7.68 7.09 9.52 
(8.14) (7.11) (6.80) (7.16) (6.95) (7.24) 
Nonanonymous treatment 
Dictator game (N = 206) (N = 288) (N = 313) (N = 99) (N = 4) (N = 193) 
Ex. rate 1:3 24.32 21.67 19.79 14.80 37.50 19.87 
(18.91) (18.75) (18.54) (15.72) (25.00) (18.21) 
Ex. rate 1:1 16.33 14.62 13.99 12.16 18.75 13.98 
(12.90) (12.34) (12.45) (10.68) (12.50) (12.82) 
Ex. rate 3:1 10.52 9.88 9.18 10.15 0.00 9.62 
(13.56) (13.17) (13.18) (12.77) (0.00) (13.80) 
Helping game (N = 625) (N = 96) (N = 42) (N = 132) (N = 62) 
14.54 11.28 9.26 8.83 8.11 
(8.13) (7.25) (7.04) (7.28) (6.69) 
Notes. Table shows averages of number of passed tokens (dictator games) and average cutoffs (helping 
game) by social distance (OR-network). Standard deviations are in parentheses. Nameless refers to matches 
between the decision maker and the partner where the identity of the partner is not known to the decision 
maker. 
In the dictator game with the 1:3 (efficient) exchange rate, the 
decision maker passes an average of 19. 19 tokens to a direct friend 
versus 12.20 tokens to a partner at social distance 4. With an (in- 
efficient) exchange rate of 3:1, the decision maker passes only 
8.03 versus 6.15 tokens, respectively. In the nonanonymous treat- 
ment, for all social distances, the decision maker passes about 
4 to 5 more tokens when altruism is efficient and about 2 to 4 
more tokens when altruism is inefficient. In the helping ame's 
anonymous treatment, he average willingness to pay is $12.77 
for a direct friend, and decreases to $7.09 for a partner at social 
distance 4. Nonanonymity increases the cutoff by approximately 
$2 across social distances. 
Curiously, in the anonymous treatment for all the dictator 
games and in the helping ame, nameless partners are treated 
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more generously than are friends of friends, despite the fact that 
the expected social distance of a randomly chosen partner is at 
least 3. In the nonanonymous treatment, on the other hand, the 
contributions to nameless partners closely track contributions 
to named partners at distance 3. The average level of giving to 
nameless partners in our dictator games is similar to the results 
reported in Andreoni and Miller (2002). Nameless partners are 
given 34.8%, 23.2%, and 16.6% of the token endowment in the 
1:3, 1:1, and 3:1 exchange rates, respectively, in our experiments, 
where nameless partners were given 32%, 24.3%, and 20% of the 
token endowment in the equivalent treatments of Andreoni and 
Miller (2002). 
We can interpret nameless decisions under anonymity as the 
decision makers' baseline or unconditional generosity, because 
they have no information about the partners. Our data repli- 
cate the well-known finding of Andreoni and Miller (2002) and of 
Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007) that individuals are highly 
heterogenous in their unconditional altruism. In particular, we 
find that many subjects are perfectly selfish: in the three dictator 
games, 28%, 46%, and 64% of subjects pass zero tokens, whereas 
in the helping game, 20% set a cutoff of zero dollars. 
V. Anonymity and Directed Altruism 
In this section, we use the anonymous treatments to analyze 
how decision makers' altruistic preferences vary with social dis- 
tance. In Section II, we motivated the following specification for 
estimating the strength of directed altruism: 
(1) xmp =aZ+ YiDMp + ym + *mp- 
Recall that xmp is the decision maker's action in the anonymous 
treatment. Because agents' actions are bounded below by zero 
and above by fifty in the dictator games, and by zero and thirty in 
the helping game, we use Tobit regressions to estimate equation 
(1). We exploit the fact that we observe multiple actions for 
each decision maker in the anonymous treatment, and control 
for unobserved heterogeneity in the decision maker's baseline 
altruistic type y m by including random effects.18 We control for 
the social distance, Dmp, between the decision maker and the 
18. Our results are very similar when we estimate equation (1) using standard 
random effects or fixed effects GLS. 
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partner by including dummy variables SDÌ (meaning a direct 
friend at social distance SD = 1) to SD5 (meaning social distance 
SD = 5). The omitted categories are SD4 for the dictator games 
and SD5 for the helping game.19 The estimated coefficient on
SDÌ in a dictator game, for example, should be interpreted as 
the number of extra tokens that the decision maker passes to 
a direct friend compared to a distant partner in the anonymous 
treatment, whereas the estimated coefficient on SD2 captures 
directed altruism toward a friend of a friend. The estimates of the 
Tobit regression for all of the dictator games and for the helping 
game are reported in the odd-numbered columns of Table III. 
We also estimate the specification with additional covariates 
and report the results in the even-numbered columns of Table III. 
We include the decision maker's action toward a nameless player 
in the anonymous treatment as a proxy for the decision maker's 
baseline altruistic type ym- In the helping ame, we can also con- 
trol for the partner's baseline altruistic type by including the part- 
ner's nameless decision (because all subjects played both roles in 
the helping ame). Furthermore, we added dummy variables for 
both players' gender, their class (sophomores, juniors, or seniors), 
and whether they share a staircase (dictator game) or a dormitory 
(helping ame).20 
Result 1. Baseline altruism and directed altruism are correlated. 
Subjects who give more to nameless partners also give more 
to specific named partners. 
The two variables that consistently and strongly predict how 
generously a decision maker treats a partner in her social network 
are the social distance from the partner and the generosity dis- 
played toward a nameless partner. Looking across all regression 
specifications, for both the dictator games and the helping ame, 
each one-unit ncrease in generosity toward a nameless partner is 
associated with a 0.56 to 1.40 unit increase in generosity toward 
a named player. Because the nameless decision and the named 
decisions were elicited one week apart, this continuity indicates a
substantial degree of stability in the decision makers' preferences 
over time. Because the effect of "nameless altruism" on "named 
19. The social network that we used for the second experiment is much larger 
because it potentially involves all Harvard undergraduates. Therefore, the maxi- 
mum social distance between subjects is higher. 
zO. Because the participation rate was lower tor the helping game, the same 
entry way" dummy variable is less useful. 
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altruism" is fairly close to 1, we view the nameless decision of a 
decision maker as a useful proxy measure of his or her baseline al- 
truism, a heterogeneous trait hat strongly influences the decision 
maker's action toward specific named partners. 
Result 2. Close social ties induce directed altruism. Allocations 
to friends are substantially higher than allocations to distant 
partners/strangers. 
Moreover, social distance also matters greatly: decision mak- 
ers are substantially more generous to direct friends than to 
partners located at greater social distance. Generosity decreases 
quickly and monotonically with social distance, although the esti- 
mated coefficients on SD2 and SD3 are not significantly different 
from each other for all games. Given the three exchange rates in 
the dictator games, the distance coefficients are of similar abso- 
lute magnitude, which implies that decision makers are making 
a greater elative sacrifice in the case of inefficient al ruism. 
Interestingly, neither the subjects' gender nor their geo- 
graphic proximity has a significant effect on generosity. However, 
the signs of the estimated gender coefficients for the decision 
maker are consistent with Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), 
who found that men are more likely to exhibit social surplus- 
maximizing preferences: they are more generous in dictator games 
when giving is efficient and less generous when giving is ineffi- 
cient. College juniors are somewhat more selfish than are sopho- 
mores and seniors; however, most of the coefficients onthe class 
dummies are insignificant. 
VI. NONANONYMITY AND FUTURE INTERACTION EFFECTS 
We now examine how a decision maker's allocation changes 
under nonanonymity (i.e., both the decision maker and the part- 
ner are told which choice was selected for payment) and discuss 
which model - enforced reciprocity, signaling, or preference-based 
reciprocity - best fits our results. 
VI.A. Graphical Analysis 
In Figure III we analyze the change in allocations (for the 
same named partner) between the nonanonymous treatment 
and the anonymous treatment. Because our helping game was 
a between-subjects design, we can only perform this exercise for 
dictator decisions. We divide decision makers into five groups 
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Figure III 
Difference between Number of Passed Tokens in the Nonanonymous and 
Anonymous Treatments in the Dictator Game by Social Distance 
For each decision maker/partner pair, the difference between the number of 
tokens allocated in the nonanonymous and the anonymous treatments was calcu- 
lated. Bars show average difference grouped by the decision maker's contribution 
level in the anonymous treatment and by social distance. The number of subjects 
in each group is presented below the bar. 
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depending on their generosity in the anonymous treatment (0 to 
9, 10 to 19, etc.), where the most selfish subjects passed between 
0 and 9 tokens. We then plot the average number of extra tokens 
passed in the nonanonymous treatment versus the anonymous 
treatment, %mp -%mp, by group and by social distance (a proxy 
for relationship value Vmp)-21 
Decision makers substantially increase their action from the 
anonymous treatment o the nonanonymous treatment, except 
the most generous under anonymity.22 This effect is strongest, 
up to ten extra tokens, when the decision maker is selfish and 
when giving is efficient. The effect is half as large when giving is 
inefficient, where decision makers pass at most five extra tokens. 
The main insight from this graph is that the nonanonymity 
effect is large for close friends and declines with social distance 
when giving is efficient (and is also somewhat present when giv- 
ing is neutral). However, when giving is inefficient, he decision 
makers' additional contributions are quite small, and do not de- 
crease with social distance for four out of the five groups. This 
result provides some preliminary evidence in support of the en- 
forced reciprocity and preference-based reciprocity mechanisms 
and against the signaling mechanism. 
The graph also suggests that directed altruism and the 
nonanonymity effect are substitutes: controlling for the strength 
of a relationship (by fixing either social distance or maximum net- 
work flow), we find that the nonanonymity effect decreases mono- 
tonically in most cases, as decision makers become more generous 
in the anonymous treatment. 
VLB. Tobit Regressions 
In Section ILA, we motivated the following specification for 
the nonanonymous condition: 
(2) 5tMP = T]Z + OXMP + 4>VMP + VM + ¿MP, 
where xmp is the decision maker's action in the nonanonymous 
treatment when matched with a specific named partner P. We 
again use panel Tobit regressions to account for censoring and 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity in the decision maker's 
21. In the NBER working paper we use network flow as an alternative proxy 
with qualitatively identical results. 
¿2. iiiven in this case, the majority ot decision makers do not decrease their 
action - the negative averages result from a few decision makers decreasing their 
contributions substantially in the nonanonymous treatment. 
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response to the nonanonymous treatment. We proxy for the 
strength of the decision maker's relationship with the partner, 
Vmp, by including either social distance dummies or the maxi- 
mum network flow measure.23 The omitted social distance is SD4 
for the dictator games and SD5 for the helping ame. The esti- 
mated coefficient onSDÌ in a dictator game, for example, should 
be interpreted as the number of extra tokens that the decision 
maker passes to a direct friend under nonanonymity compared to 
the number of extra tokens that he or she passes to a stranger un- 
der nonanonymity. All of our regressions control for the academic 
class of the decision maker and of the partner, because we expect 
the nonanonymity effect to be smaller for juniors and (especially) 
seniors, because the participants are less likely than sophomores 
to interact with each other in the future. On the right-hand side 
we also include the decision maker's action toward a nameless 
partner in the nonanonymous treatment as a proxy for the ran- 
dom effect VM that captures heterogeneity in how decision makers 
respond to nonanonymity. 
Importantly, we control for the decision maker's intrinsic al- 
truism toward the same partner P by including her decision in 
the anonymous treatment, xmp, on the right-hand sides of all of 
our regressions. This inclusion poses a problem for the helping 
game given its between-subject design, because for no decision 
maker/partner pair in the nonanonymous treatment do we ob- 
serve the decision maker's choice for that partner in the anony- 
mous treatment. Therefore, we estimate it by running an auxiliary 
random-effects Tobit regression with data from the anonymous 
treatment, and include social distance dummies and the same 
set of covariates Z (nameless decision, class dummies) as in our 
empirical specification f the nonanonymity mechanism. 
For each of the three dictator games and for the helping ame, 
we estimate three variants of our empirical model. We first use 
only social distance to proxy for the strength of a decision maker's 
relationship to the partner, then use only maximum network flow, 
and finally use both measures in the same regression. All results 
are reported in Table IV. 
Result 3. The observability of decisions by partners increases giv- 
ing more for friends than for strangers. The differential effect 
is only induced when giving is efficient; therefore, the prospect 
of future interactions increases the surplus created. 
23. In one specification, we include both measures in the same regression. 
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Our main finding is that, controlling for a decision maker's 
anonymous action, her response to nonanonymity increases with 
the strength of the relationship to the partner, but only if giv- 
ing is efficient (i.e., surplus-increasing). This is true regardless of 
whether we proxy for the strength of a relationship using social 
distance or maximum network flow. Note that this result is consis- 
tent with both the enforced reciprocity and the preference-based 
reciprocity mechanisms, but not with the signaling mechanism 
(which predicts excess generosity toward friends for all exchange 
rates). 
The magnitude of the nonanonymity effect is large, particu- 
larly in the dictator game with exchange rate 1:3. In this game, 
decision makers increase their action by 4.18 tokens when their 
partners are direct friends as opposed to socially distant partners 
(statistically significant at the 1% level). The social closeness ef- 
fect is smaller, but still significantly different from zero, at the 5% 
level for friends of friends (SD2) in the efficient dictator game.24 
Our results also provide some evidence for enforced, rather 
than preference-based, reciprocity. 
Result 4. The nonanonymity effect increases with maximum net- 
work flow. 
In Table IV we estimate a specification for each game includ- 
ing both social distance dummies and maximum network flow as 
covariates. For both the efficient dictator game and the helping 
game, we find that the coefficients on the social distance dummies 
decrease and become insignificant when we add network flow, 
whereas the coefficient on flow remains significant for the helping 
game. Additionally, for the helping game, a likelihood ratio test re- 
jects the specification excluding network flow in favor of the spec- 
ification with both social distance and network flow (p < .01).25 
We also estimate a specification for the dictator game using 
network flow for allocations to direct friends, presented in Table V, 
to further demonstrate that network flow is capturing information 
about allocations not included in social distance (because here all 
partners have a social distance of one). Moreover, for direct friends, 
24. In contrast, when we tested for directed altruism, we did not find such a 
strong effect for friends of friends. 
25. For all three dictator games and the helping game, we cannot reject the 
specification with only network flow in favor of the specification with both network 
flow and social distance (p > .40 for all specifications). 
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TABLE V 
Effects of "Average Time Spent per Week" and Network Flow on Decision 
Makers' Generosity toward Direct Friends under Nonanonymity 
(Dictator Game Only) 
Dictator 1:3 Dictator 1:1 Dictator 3:1 
(1) (2) (3) 
Anonymous pass 0.25 0.238 0.474 
(0.063)** (0.211) (0.115)** 
Network flow 0.676 -0.024 0.155 
(0.306)* (0.395) (0.262) 
Average time spent per week -0.328 -0.089 -0.060 
(0.368) (0.488) (0.323) 
Const. 12.131 13.946 4.998 
(3.640)** (5.493)* (3.286) 
Obs. 206 206 206 
Notes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of tokens 
passed by the decision maker to a direct friend in the nonanonymous dictator games. All specifications are 
estimated as Tobit regressions with decision-maker random effects. "Anonymous action" denotes the decision 
maker's action for the specific partner in the anonymous treatment. Network flow is calculated for a circle of 
trust K = 2. Average time spent per week is a categorical variable which takes the values 0 (less than half an 
hour per week), 1 (30 minutes to 1 hour), 2 (1 hour to 2 hours), 3 (2 hours to 4 hours), 4 (4 hours to 8 hours), 
and 5 (more than 8 hours a week). 
Significance levels: ]: 10%; *: 5%; **: 1% . 
we can include a control for the amount of time that the decision 
maker spends with the partner, because this would be an aspect 
of the relationship ossibly omitted by social distance that would 
still be consistent with the preference-based model of reciprocity.26 
We find that when giving is efficient, greater network flow in- 
creases the decision maker's generosity toward a direct friend un- 
der nonanonymity, even when we control for time spent together. 
Thus, network flow predicts generous allocations beyond the social 
distance information. Moreover, the estimated coefficient on time 
spent together is consistently insignificant and negative. We inter- 
pret these findings as evidence for the enforced reciprocity model. 
Result 5. The nonanonymity effect and directed altruism are sub- 
stitutes. Altruistic individuals have a smaller change in allo- 
cations under nonanonymity than selfish individuals. 
We also find that the estimated coefficients on the decision 
maker's anonymous action, xmp, are always less than one, which 
26. However, the measure of time spent together is uncorrelated with our 
network flow measure for direct friends (p = .03). Thus, any predictive power of 
network flow appears not to relate to the frequency of interaction. 
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TABLE VI 
Relative Magnitudes of Directed Altruism and Nonanonymity Effects as 
Percentages of all the Decision Makers' Average Nameless Action and as 
Percentages of a Standard Deviation in Nameless Actions 
Directed altruism relative to Effect of nonanonymity relative to 
SDÌ SD2 SDS SDÌ SD2 SDS Network flow 
Dictator game (1:3) 
Average 52 8 -8 24 18 3 19 
Standard dev 39 8 -4 14 10 2 11 
Dictator game (1:1) 
Average 52 16 3 21 12 9 10 
Standard dev. 41 14 5 24 14 10 11 
Dictator game (3:1) 
Average 95 49 43 -7 8 -3 -6 
Standard dev. 48 25 23 -4 4-1 -3 
Helping game 
Average 88 36 12 35 13 19 30 
Standard dev. 192 82 28 69 25 38 59 
Notes. An "average" row is calculated by dividing estimates for directed altruism (Table III) and the 
effect of nonanonymity (Table IV) by the average nameless decision in the anonymous treatment (Table II, 
"Nameless" column). A "standard eviation" row is determined by calculating the increase in nameless decision 
(measured in standard deviations) that would have a predicted increase in choice equal to the estimates for 
directed altruism and nonanonymity. For the "network flow" column we report the estimated effect of a one- 
standard-deviation increase in network flow (equal to 10 units of network flow for "circle of trust" K = 2). 
implies that directed altruism and the decision maker's response 
to nonanonymity are indeed substitutes. The total difference be- 
tween the nonanonymous allocation and the anonymous alloca- 
tion will be smaller for a more altruistic subject than for a selfish 
subject. This conclusion is also consistent with the enforced reci- 
procity model. 
VII. Comparing Altruism to Enforced Reciprocity 
Having established that both directed altruism and enforced 
reciprocity play a substantial role in determining allocation 
decisions when subjects are connected through a social network, 
we now attempt to benchmark the relative importance of each 
effect, compared to baseline altruism, for each condition we 
study. In Table VI, we divide the estimated coefficients on social 
distance dummies (SDÌ to SD3) from both the anonymous (i.e., 
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measuring directed altruism) and the nonanonymous (i.e., mea- 
suring enforced reciprocity) allocations by the average generosity 
toward nameless partners in the anonymous treatment. In 
other words, we calculate what percent of the baseline altruism 
effect (relative to selfishness) the network effects represent. For 
the nonanonymous case, we also include the estimated effect 
of a one-standard-deviation increase in network flow. Directed 
altruism toward friends i  equal to 52% of the average nameless 
generosity shown in the efficient dictator game, and is equal 
to 88% for the helping game. When altruism is inefficient, 
the directed altruism effect almost equals average nameless 
generosity (a 95% increase) - nearly double the magnitude of 
the efficient case (although, recall that the absolute increase 
in tokens is slightly smaller). Social distance, therefore, is as 
important a determinant ofa subject's generosity as his or her 
baseline altruism, particularly when giving is inefficient. 
In the nonanonymous treatment, friends receive an extra 
transfer of surplus, equal to almost 24% of average nameless gen- 
erosity for the efficient dictator game and about 35% of nameless 
generosity for the helping ame. Friends of friends receive an ex- 
tra transfer of about 18% of nameless generosity in the efficient 
dictator game. We find a similar pattern, but with slightly smaller 
magnitudes, for the neutral dictator game. Taken all together, the 
effect of nonanonymity is about half as large as the directed al- 
truism effect. 
Additionally, the nonanonymity effect isgenerally weaker for 
decision makers who are juniors and seniors: the signs on the 
junior and senior dummies are consistently negative, although 
they are not always tatistically significant. This finding is consis- 
tent with our model of enforced reciprocity, because the length of 
the future relationship (and, thus, its value) is potentially shorter 
(lower) for upperclassmen, because they will ive in the same dorm 
for a shorter time. 
We also consider a different benchmark for the magnitude of 
directed altruism and enforced reciprocity: how large an increase 
in baseline altruism (i.e., how many standard eviations) would 
it take to equal the effect of social connections?27 Therefore, in 
Table VI, we also report the estimated coefficients onSDÌ, SD2, 
SD3, and network flow as percentages of the standard eviation 
27. This measure is used in Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman, Kariv, 
and Markovits (2007). 
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of the distribution fnameless decisions. We find that greater so- 
cial proximity to the partner in the anonymous dictator games 
moves the decision maker's generosity by at least 0.39 standard 
deviation, and by a maximum of 1.93 standard eviations in the 
anonymous helping ame. Similarly, the effect of enforced reci- 
procity by this comparison represents an additional increase in 
generosity almost half as large as the altruism effect for the effi- 
cient dictator game and the helping ame (a change of 0.14 and 
0.69 standard eviation, respectively). 
VIII. Correlation in Altruistic Preferences 
Our design allows us to analyze whether subjects who are 
more altruistic also have friends who are more altruistic. We sep- 
arate decision makers into (approximate) quintiles based on their 
choices for nameless partners. Tables VII and VIII present the 
resulting distributions offriends' generosity. 
Result 6. Friends ort by baseline altruism. Subjects with a high 
level of baseline altruism have more friends with a high level 
of baseline altruism, whereas elfish subjects have more self- 
ish friends. 
First, we find that altruistic and selfish subjects have the 
same number of friends.28 However, a subject's baseline altruism 
is correlated with the baseline altruism of his or her friends (x2 
test: DG p < .001, HG p < .01). That is, selfish subjects have a 
greater number of selfish friends, and fewer altruistic friends, 
whereas altruists have fewer selfish friends and a greater number 
of altruistic friends. In particular, the most altruistic quintile in 
the helping ame has 25% more highly altruistic friends than any 
other group; in the dictator game, the two most altruistic groups 
had over 20% more highly altruistic friends than any other 
group. Moreover, a subject's friends' mean nameless allocation 
choice increases with the subject's baseline altruism. The most 
altruistic subjects have friends that are 25% more altruistic than 
the most selfish subjects in the dictator game, and 14% more 
altruistic in the helping game. Using ¿-tests, the third, fourth, 
and fifth quintiles are significantly different from the first in 
the helping ame, and the fourth and fifth are different from the 
first in the dictator game. A nonparametric equality-of-medians 
28. The same holds for the number of people who list the subject as a friend. 
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TABLE IX 
Regressing Average Allocation to Partners from Direct Friends 
on Baseline Altruism 
Helping game 
(1) (2) 
Partner's nameless decision e [1, 5] 1.048 0.357 
(1.02) (0.96) 
Partner's nameless decision e [6, 12] 3.074 0.545 
(0.93)** (0.91) 
Partner's nameless decision e [13, 15] 4.567 0.521 
(0.92)** (0.98) 
Partner's nameless decision e [16, 30] 5.275 -0.384 
(1.17)** (1.27) 
Decision maker's nameless choice -0.474 
(0.054)** 
Const. 9.747** 7.679** 
(0.73)** (0.73)** 
Obs. 549 549 
Notes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is a partner's average allo- 
cation in anonymous treatment from decisions made by friends. 
test rejects the hypothesis that the five quintiles are drawn from 
distributions with the same median (DG p = .039, HG p < .026). 
It seems that either subjects prefer to become friends with people 
who have similar social preferences, or their social preferences 
become more similar after they initiate a friendship. 
An important consequence of the correlation i friends' base- 
line altruism is that it pays to be generous. For the anonymous 
treatment of the helping ame, Table IX (column (1)) displays the 
results of regressing the average allocation to partners from de- 
cisions made by direct friends on the partners' baseline altruism 
(by quintile): partners with higher baseline altruism have sub- 
stantially higher earnings. For example, direct friends of the most 
altruistic partners set the cutoff more than five dollars higher 
than the direct friends of the most selfish partners. Interestingly, 
this effect isentirely due to kinder partners having nicer friends, 
and is not due to generally kind partners being treated more nicely 
by their friends: we have already shown in our directed altruism 
regressions in Table III that decision makers do not treat gener- 
ous partners better. Indeed, when we also control for the average 
baseline altruism of the decision makers in Table IX (column (2)), 
the partners' baseline altruism no longer predicts their earnings 
from friends' decisions. 
DIRECTED ALTRUISM AND ENFORCED RECIPROCITY 1849 
IX. Conclusion 
We use large field experiments in real-world social networks 
to jointly measure two explanations of prosocial behavior: the 
prospect of future interaction a d directed altruism. We find sup- 
port for both mechanisms, although the future interaction effect 
is half as strong as the directed altruism effect. The mechanisms 
also have different welfare ffects: directed altruism promotes 
equitable allocations, whereas enforced reciprocity promotes effi- 
cient allocations. 
Our results suggest that it is difficult tomeasure the impor- 
tance of norms of reciprocity empirically (based on dynamic game 
effects) without first measuring underlying directed altruism. For 
example, in empirical studies of informal lending and risk shar- 
ing, it may be as important to measure directed altruism across 
social ties (using diagnostic games) as it is to observe cash and in- 
kind transfers. Although both directed altruism and enforced reci- 
procity suggest that capital in small communities will more likely 
be directed toward close friends and relatives, the relative impor- 
tance of altruism over reciprocity may suggest that resources are 
not being allocated efficiently to the most profitable projects. A 
better understanding of the strength and reach of altruistic ties 
within and across families can help policy makers target outside 
transfers more ffectively.29 
Our result that friends cluster by baseline altruism raises 
another interesting question for future research: do our friends 
shape our social preferences (treatment effect), or do we seek 
out friends with similar social preferences (selection effect)? This 
could help explain to what extent he distribution fpreferences, 
as observed in the laboratory by Andreoni and Miller (2002) and 
Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007), is endogenous. In Leider 
et al. (forthcoming), we provide preliminary evidence against se- 
lection based on altruistic type. When we elicit beliefs of partners 
about the generosity of their friends toward them and toward 
anonymous others, we find that partners expect to be treated 
better by their friends, but subjects do not incorporate their 
friends' specific baseline altruism into their beliefs. Therefore, it 
appears that although friends tend to cluster by their altruistic 
type, their beliefs about decision makers' generosity are mostly 
29. Angelucci et al. (2008) show that random positive income shocks from 
the Progresa natural experiment are shared within rather than across extended 
families (consistent with a model of directed altruism). 
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driven by expectations of directed altruism. Future research 
can utilize carefully designed field experiments to measure the 
relative strength of selection versus social interaction in the 
formation a d evolution of social preferences. 
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